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Transcendence, Immanence and  
Mental Health
christopher c. h. cook
Summary
The concept of transcendence has featured in debates about  spirituality 
and psychiatry both as a core defining feature of what spirituality might 
be considered to be and also as a significant point of contention. However, 
it is amenable to interpretation within both psychological and theo logical 
frameworks of reference and provides a possible common point of ref-
erence to professional and academic discourse. Properly understood, 
transcendence should be seen in a close relationship with immanence, 
rather than in opposition to it. A clearer analysis of the relationship 
between immanence and transcendence in spiritual traditions and prac-
tices has potential to clarify some of the present controversies in this field.
Theology, transcendence and mental health
Recent controversies concerning the place of spirituality in psychiatry have 
touched on a variety of academic, ethical and professional questions (see 
Chapter 1). These have been directed at the proper interpretation of the 
research evidence base, the nature of the concept of spirituality, the nature 
and management of proper professional boundaries and the nature of the 
relationship between science and religion, among other things. However, 
relatively little theological attention has been given to these controversies, or 
indeed to the topic of mental health more generally. This might be thought 
surprising, given the way in which this professional debate touches upon 
some important theological concerns and also given the important relation-
ships between mental and spiritual well-being (Cook 2011, pp. 151–202; 
Koenig et al. 2012, pp. 123–44). Simon Dein, Harold Koenig and I have 
suggested elsewhere (Dein et al. 2012) that critical theological engagement 
with the various issues at hand might well shed some useful light on the 
pres ent controversies and on the nature of the relationship between spiritu-
ality and mental health more generally.
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As an example of the kind of engagement that I think could be helpful, 
this chapter will focus on the theological concept of transcendence as illu-
minative of the relationship between spirituality and psychiatry, although 
this will necessarily touch on a number of other important themes and 
discip lines with relevance to the topic at hand, including the nature of the 
secular context within which the present debate has been located. But first, 
why might transcendence be a theme worth examining in more detail, and 
why select this rather than any one of a number of other potentially promis-
ing starting points? For example, the nature and concept of spirituality itself 
is a matter in which sociologists, theologians and others have shown great 
interest, reflected in a significant literature (Flanagan and Jupp 2007; Roof 
1999; Jones et al. 1986; Principe 1983; Sheldrake 2010), which is often not 
adequately attended to in scientific publications. In many ways, this might 
seem a more logical starting point. It might also lead to some illuminating 
insights into the scientific and clinical literature, and more attention to such 
things is surely needed. However, there are a number of reasons why tran-
scendence would seem worthy of particular attention.
First, transcendence is a central concept to the present debate, both in the 
minds of protagonists and antagonists. This alone might make it a worthy 
topic for further theological attention. Second, however, it also provides a 
useful way in to beginning to think about some of the important theological 
issues at stake, and it provides a helpful terminology for doing this. Third, 
and perhaps most importantly, I think it also has utility for finding a way 
forward in terms of a more constructive, coherent and clinically relevant 
debate from within which some greater measure of agreement might emerge.
Transcendence as a central concept
There are significant references within the present debate about spirituality 
and psychiatry to the concept of transcendence, all of which might sug-
gest that this is an important issue. It would seem that many people do in 
fact have transcendence in mind as a core concept when they speak about 
spiritu ality (Cook 2004; Zinnbauer et al. 1997). In the field of addiction, the 
‘power greater than ourselves’ referred to in the Twelve Steps of Alcohol-
ics Anonymous provides a good example of the incorporation of a concept 
of transcendence into a programme of recovery (Cook 2009). In mental 
health generally, it is often a transcendent relationship (i.e. with God) that is 
understood as being at the heart of whatever it is that appears to many to be 
beneficial about spirituality in conferring resilience towards and improved 
recovery from mental disorders. For example, Ellermann and Reed refer 
to spirituality as ‘a self-transcendence whereby personal boundaries are 
expanded transpersonally to connect one to a higher power or purpose 
greater than the self’ (Ellermann and Reed 2001). It is thus a term that, 
along with cognate terms, is commonly employed by clinicians and scien-
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tists, users of mental health services, members of mutual help groups and 
others as being meaningful in reference to the relationship between spiritu-
ality and mental health.
Harold Koenig, in the second edition of the Handbook of Religion and 
Health, refers to transcendence as central to his definitions both of spiritual-
ity and of religion:
Religion involves beliefs, practices, and rituals related to the transcend-
ent, where the transcendent is God, Allah, HaShem, or a Higher Power in 
Western religious traditions, or to Brahman, manifestations of Brahman, 
Buddha, Dao, or ultimate truth/reality in Eastern traditions. (Koenig et al. 
2012, p. 45; original emphasis preserved)
Spirituality is distinguished from all other things – humanism, values, 
morals, and mental health – by its connection to that which is sacred, 
the transcendent. The transcendent is that which is outside of the self, 
and yet also within the self – and in Western traditions is called God, 
Allah, HaShem, or a Higher Power, and in Eastern traditions may be 
called Brahman, manifestations of Brahman, Buddha, Dao or ultimate 
truth/reality … Thus, our definition of spirituality is very similar to reli-
gion, and there is clearly overlap. The one common element, the minimal 
requirement to call something religious or spiritual is its connection with 
the transcendent, however understood. (Koenig et al. 2012, p. 46; origin al 
emphasis preserved)
Koenig finally concludes his section on the definition of spirituality with 
a recommendation that ‘for the sake of conceptual clarity researchers not 
include personal beliefs that have nothing to do with the transcendent under 
the term spirituality’ (p. 47). 
In a not dissimilar fashion, although employing the ‘sacred’ rather than 
the transcendent as the core category, Pargament points out that definitions 
of spirituality ‘without a sacred core’ create a boundary problem. Defin-
itional boundaries that are expanded and ill-defined potentially ‘include 
virtually any pathway leading to virtually any valued destination’ (Parga-
ment 1999). Once this happens the concept becomes more or less useless 
in research, easily confounded with psychological variables, vulnerable to 
fragmentation and at least potentially is completely meaningless.
Whether most researchers have in the past, when choosing and construct-
ing measures of spirituality for their research, observed such clarity in their 
thinking as exhorted by the injunctions of Koenig, Pargament and others is 
clearly doubtful (Cook 2004). However, it behoves researchers to pay more 
attention to such things, and transcendence, as a concept, would appear to 
be the closest thing that we have to something that is widely acknow ledged 
as being both distinctive and characteristic of spirituality.
As Koenig points out, the extension of the concept of spirituality to 
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psychological states and beliefs not concerned with transcendence is both 
unnecessary and unhelpful. Psychological language and concepts are ade-
quate for such things and people clearly find (for example) meaning and 
purpose in life outside of what might usually be considered ‘spiritual’ in any 
strict sense. When I have asked my own patients, in the course of clinical 
practice, what matters most to them or what confers purpose to their lives, 
they frequently refer to family and loved ones. In a sense, these are ‘spiritual’ 
conversations, but it is not necessary to use the language of spirituality in 
such clinical practice (unless of course that is the language preferred by the 
patient), and it is confusing to do so in research.
This is not to deny that in published writing spirituality often is con-
cerned with such things as meaning and purpose, relationships with loved 
ones, morality and a range of other concepts that do not require the lan-
guage of spirituality. Furthermore, these other things that are often included 
under the umbrella of spirituality usually do relate directly or indirectly 
to transcendence, in one form or another (Cook 2004). Such things might 
be considered a part of what Kenneth Pargament refers to as the ‘sacred 
ring’, that is, a realm of life within which things become sacred (we might 
say here, transcendent or spiritual) through association with a sacred ‘core’ 
(Pargament 2011). However, if we are to be clear about what is really at 
the heart of the concept, about how it is to be distinguished from variables 
more easily defined in purely psychological terms and about how it is to 
be operationalized in research, Koenig’s recommendation that we focus on 
transcendence would seem to be an important one to heed.
Transcendence also emerges as a point of contention. For example, Rob 
Poole states that ‘The insistence that even nonbelievers have a spiritual life 
shows a lack of respect for those who find meaning within beliefs that reject 
the transcendent and the supernatural’ (Poole et al. 2008). It is not necessar-
ily the case, although it might be a reasonable assumption, that the assertion 
that ‘nonbelievers have a spiritual life’ means that those who do not self-
identify as spiritual nonetheless (in the eyes of those who do) have a life in 
relation to transcendent reality. Some definitions of spirituality maintain 
an ambiguity about the place of transcendence, or even explicitly exclude 
the necessity for it (e.g. Goddard 1995). However, it is clearly the case that 
there are those who do and those who do not assert the existence of some 
kind of transcendent reality, and that for both transcendence may indeed 
be the crucial dimension of what spirituality is all about (whether it is then 
affirmed or rejected). For most (but not necessarily all) of those who identify 
themselves as spiritual, relationship to a transcendent order would seem to 
be what they value as central to their spirituality. For those who distance 
themselves from spirituality, transcendence may well (perhaps often) be the 
aspect of spirituality to which they most object.
A rather different argument is brought to bear by Richard Sloan, who 
fears that the inclusion of spirituality and religion within healthcare will 
somehow trivialize religion. In his book Blind Faith: The Unholy Alliance of 
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Religion and Medicine, in a chapter entitled ‘Trivialising the Transcendent: 
Be Careful What You Wish For’, he writes: ‘By implementing the approach 
of scientific reductionism, the transcendent aspects of the religious experi-
ence are diminished if not lost altogether’ (Sloan 2006, p. 241).
There is an implication here of the possibility of reducing the idea of tran-
scendence (thus spirituality) to psychological (or other scientific) variables, 
thus effectively negating its reality other than as a belief in a certain kind 
of thing (a ‘thing’ that might be understood not to exist in reality at all). 
Whether scientific research actually does this, or is even capable of such a 
thing, is another matter. The possibility of ‘trivializing’ religion in this way 
exists, and Sloan therefore argues that it is best kept out of medicine.
Whether the concern is that a transcendent dimension will cause offence to 
those who deny it, or that it will somehow be degraded for those who value 
it, the clear implication is that transcendence should be kept out of clinical 
practice. On the other hand, for those who affirm the place of spiritu ality in 
research and clinical practice, it often seems to be transcendence that they 
are affirming. Transcendence, then, would appear to be at the heart of the 
debate for both detractors and protagonists. But what is transcendence?
Transcendence in psychological and clinical discourse
We have already seen that Poole refers to ‘the transcendent and the super-
natural’ together – as though these concepts are likely to be related. Koenig 
et al. also write that ‘spirituality is intimately related to the supernatural’ 
(Koenig et al. 2012, p. 46) and defines transcendence in terms of various 
western or eastern theological traditions (including, importantly, the secular 
western concept of a ‘Higher Power’). However, not all writers on matters 
of spirituality and health understand transcendence in this way.
Fred Craigie, for example, has suggested that transcendence may in fact, 
importantly for the psychologist, be concerned with the transcendence of 
suffering (Craigie 2008). Similarly, in Howden’s Spirituality Assessment 
Scale, transcendence is understood as ‘The ability to reach or go beyond the 
limits of usual experience; the capacity, willingness, or experience of rising 
above or overcoming body or psychic conditions; or the capacity for achiev-
ing wellness or self-healing’ (Burkhardt and Nagai-Jacobson 2005, p. 155).
Transcendence in this sense, which I shall refer to as self-transcendence, 
is about facing pain and suffering, accepting that some things are unchange-
able and finding a meaningful way through life that acknowledges these 
realities. Craigie identifies a variety of clinical approaches to helping 
patients achieve this kind of transcendence (Craigie 2008, pp. 263–309). 
These include ‘letting go’, acceptance, mindfulness, non-attachment, seren-
ity, spiritual surrender, gratitude and forgiveness. Of these approaches, it 
seems to me, only spiritual surrender more or less requires some kind of 
understanding of the transcendent as God or a Higher Power. The  others all 
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employ a psychological kind of self-transcendence that requires no concept 
of the supernatural, God or any Higher Power external to the self.
Ellermann and Reed, whose definition of spirituality in terms of self-
transcendence was mentioned above, define self-transcendence in terms of 
‘the person’s capacity to expand self-boundaries intrapersonally, interper-
sonally and transpersonally, to acquire a perspective that exceeds ordinary 
boundaries and limitations’ (Ellermann and Reed 2001).1 The definition 
of spiritu ality that these authors associate with this understanding of self- 
transcendence clearly refers to a ‘higher power’, but, again, I don’t think it 
is necessary to infer belief in a higher power from this kind of self-transcend-
ence. It is more about a personal capacity to ‘expand self-boundaries’, thus a 
capacity for a certain sort of self-understanding. Self-transcendence certain-
ly might include more than this. It might include some kind of perspective 
that embraces a transcendent other. However, it does not necessarily do so.
Polly Young-Eisendrath identifies psychotherapy as a kind of ‘ordinary 
transcendence’:
This kind of transcendence provides evidence and insight that being human 
means being dependent, and that the life space we inhabit is one of inter-
dependence, not independence. It also shows us that self- protectiveness, 
isolation, and the ubiquitous human desire for omnipotence produce 
great suffering. (Young-Eisendrath 2000, p. 133)
Ordinary transcendence, again, is a kind of transcendence that does not 
require reference to a transcendent other in any supernatural or theological 
sense. It is a form of self-transcendence, a transcendence of self-protective-
ness and of the lust for power.
For some clinicians and researchers, then, transcendence is primarily con-
cerned with self-transcendence of a kind that reaches out intrapersonally 
and interpersonally but not necessarily transpersonally. While this kind 
of self-transcendence clearly has important applications in psychotherapy 
and counselling, it is more about transcending previous understandings 
and limitations of the self by expanding them. Each time this occurs, the 
new understandings, the new limitations, remain a part of the self and do 
not constitute or refer to any transcendent order external to the self. There 
 cannot be said to have been any movement beyond, or transcendence of, 
that self that is, in itself, the very agent of the process of self-transcendence. 
If one does not presuppose a transcendent person or reality, in some sense 
outside of the self, providing the ability for human beings to transcend their 
own finite resources, we are really talking here only about apparent tran-
scendence or transcendence of previously realized personal resources, but 
not any fundamental transcendence of human limitations.
1 Cf Reed 1991, where self-transcendence is said to refer ‘broadly to a characteristic of 
developmental maturity whereby there is an expansion of self-boundaries and an orienta-
tion toward broadened life perspectives and purposes’.
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Kenneth Pargament, who defines spirituality as ‘a search for the sacred’, 
understands transcendent reality as being at the core of the sacred. Tran-
scendence, he writes, ‘speaks to the perception that there is something out of 
the ordinary in a particular object or experience, something that goes beyond 
our everyday lives and beyond our usual understanding’ (Pargament 2011, 
p. 39). In this psychological sense, transcendence is concerned with percep-
tion, experience or understanding of something that is ‘out of the ordinary’ 
or beyond understanding. In this sense, it would appear that transcendence 
is concerned primarily with human interpretation of human experience. It 
is about our capacity to identify a thing or experience as being ‘extraordin-
ary’. As with self-transcendence, this understanding of transcendence does 
not require any acceptance of a transcendent reality. Although it might hint 
at such a reality, or even explicitly refer to it, it is easily understood by 
a scep tical observer in non-supernatural terms. It is essentially a human 
capacity to interpret experiences in a certain kind of way. It does make the 
important step of requiring the conceptualization of a transcendent other 
(in some supernatural, extraordinary or theological sense) but it does not 
require a commitment (at least on the part of the impartial observer) to the 
onto logical reality of such a transcendent order. For want of a better term, 
I will call this ‘interpretive transcendence’.
What I am calling interpretive transcendence includes more than just a 
hermeneutic, perceptual or experiential dimension. Ralph Piedmont, for 
example, refers to a transcendent perspective that is a motivational domain, 
constituting a dimension of personality: 
Spiritual Transcendence refers to the capacity of individuals to stand 
outside of their immediate sense of time and place to view life from a 
larger, more objective perspective. This transcendent perspective is one in 
which a person sees a fundamental unity underlying the diverse strivings 
of nature and finds a bonding with others that cannot be severed, not even 
by death. (Piedmont 1999, p. 988)
As with Pargament’s approach, this is very much about interpretation of 
experience, but Piedmont describes it more as a ‘fundamental capacity of 
the individual, a source of intrinsic motivation that drives, directs, and 
selects behaviours’ (Piedmont 1999, p. 988). Components of this transcend-
ence include a sense of connectedness, a belief in the unitive nature of life, 
fulfilment found in encounters with a transcendent reality, tolerance of 
para doxes, non-judgementalness, a desire to live in the moment, and grati-
tude. It thus also shares certain features (e.g. mindfulness and gratitude) 
with Craigie’s approach to self-transcendence. However, it goes beyond this 
in requiring a perception of or motivation by belief in something beyond the 
resources of the self.
Interpretive transcendence may or may not be understood in explicitly 
theological terms as making reference to God (or gods). Where there is not 
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explicit theological language, it is likely that there will at least be a mys-
tical element, relating to the ineffability of the experience (Cook 2004a), 
but this in itself does not require a theistic stance. Where there is explicit 
theo logical language, a degree of ambiguity is often identifiable in relation 
to any explicitly theological assertions. At least there is often a reluctance 
to identify unambiguously the transcendent with traditional conceptions of 
God. For example, Pargament refers to the sacred as encompassing concepts 
of ‘God, the divine, and the transcendent, but it is not limited to notions of 
higher powers’,2 and later says that ‘By defining spirituality as the search for 
the sacred, we avoid restricting ourselves to narrow or traditional concep-
tions of God’ (Pargament 1999). I think that this kind of ambiguity arises 
from the perception among many clinicians and researchers that there is a 
category of experience that patients and research subjects describe which 
putatively relates to a transcendent reality that lies outside themselves (a 
reality about which the impartial and scientific clinician or researcher makes 
no judgement as to whether it really exists or not). The ambiguity arises 
because it is assumed that subjects who describe this experience in terms of 
relationship with God, and those who describe it in non-theological terms, 
are in fact having the same kind of experience. This assumption might well 
be questionable on scientific, phenomenological and other grounds, but it is 
a good one to enable a grouping together of experiences that seem to have 
something (‘transcendence’) in common. The cost of doing so is the intro-
duction of the ambiguity. Is transcendence about God, or not?
Finally, there must of course be a kind of transcendence that is unam-
biguously theological. Let’s call it theological transcendence. Theological 
transcendence goes beyond both self-transcendence and interpretive tran-
scendence in requiring a faith commitment. However, whatever position 
one might hold on this kind of transcendence, a number of things might 
already seem clear. First, self-transcendence and interpretive transcendence 
are clinically, psychologically and pragmatically very important. No theo-
logical (or a-theological) perspective is likely to undermine or invalidate 
the relevance of these kinds of transcendence to therapeutic practice or to 
any understanding of how people cope with adversity (including the par-
ticular adversities associated with mental disorder). Whatever one believes 
about God or any other conception of a transcendent reality, the ways in 
which people find within themselves resources for self-transcendence, and 
2 Elsewhere, he writes: ‘At the heart of the sacred lies God, divine beings, or a tran-
scendent reality’ (my emphasis). It is left unclear, so far as I can see, as to whether a 
transcendent reality is understood here as an alternative instance of the sacred, contrasted 
with God, higher powers and divine beings, or a category within which God, higher 
powers and divine beings are but instances alongside others within a sacred/transcendent 
category. As noted above, there is also a perceptual, experiential, emphasis to Parga-
ment’s understanding of transcendence that puts the focus on the human psychological 
account of things, rather than on a theological or conceptual account of what it is (if 
anything) that is actually, objectively, being experienced or perceived.
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the extent to which people interpret reality in terms of the transcendent, will 
remain highly relevant to psychological and clinical understandings of how 
people cope with and overcome adversity.
At this point, I think that some comment is needed about the ‘supernat-
ural’. It is interesting that both Koenig and Poole, writing from opposite and 
different perspectives on the value of spirituality in healthcare, both associate 
transcendence with the supernatural. While a certain sort of understanding 
of the supernatural might well be associated with an interpretive transcend-
ence, I do not think that it has to be. Indeed, there are many who might 
consider themselves ‘spiritual’, or who relate to a transcendent reality, who 
either understand their spirituality or transcendence in very natural terms 
(Capra 1975; Heelas 2008), or else who do not see the activities of a tran-
scendent (e.g. divine) agency in this world as subverting or contravening the 
natural order but rather as working within it in some way. The matter of the 
supernatural, then, is an additional consideration but I do not think that any 
particular view on the supernatural is necessary to either self-transcendence 
or interpretive transcendence.3
Transcendence and immanence
To some extent the appeal of the term transcendence may lie in the com-
monality that it represents across diverse faith traditions in a secular age. At 
the same time (and perhaps for the same reasons), it is a cause of concern to 
those who do not believe (Hick 1989, p. 6). However, transcendence can be 
understood in a variety of ways.
In some simple and fundamental sense, transcendence infers a going 
above or beyond of some kind. Exactly what it is that is exceeded is left 
unspecified. Implicitly or explicitly, transcendence is usually contrasted and 
compared with the concept of immanence. It is the immanent order that 
transcendence goes ‘beyond’. Immanence revolves around central themes 
concerned with remaining within what is immediately present, the natural 
perceivable order of things. To a large extent, immanence and transcend-
ence are spatial metaphors (cf. Tillich 1955, p. 292), but the fact that they 
are inherently metaphorical should alert us to the likely difficulty in pinning 
them down and defining the relationship between them. So, for example, in 
his Systematic Theology, Tillich (1955) expresses the relationship in terms 
of being. For Tillich, God is understood as ‘being itself’ or ‘the ground of 
being’, but not as ‘a being’ or even the ‘highest being’. Understood in this 
way, the relationship between immanence and transcendence becomes one 
of relationship between the finite and the infinite.4 All beings participate, 
3 Academic theology also has problems with crude forms of supernaturalism, as for 
instance in the understanding of miracles (see, e.g., Basinger 2011).
4 I am oversimplifying somewhat, for while Tillich talks of the infinity of being-itself, 
he also states that ‘Being itself is beyond finitude and infinity’ (1955, p. 263).
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in a finite way, in being-itself while also being transcended by being-itself. 
God is ‘the power of being in everything and above everything’ (1955, p. 
261), ‘God transcends every being and also the totality of being – the world’ 
(p. 263). But Tillich also finds it true to say that ‘God is merged into … finite 
beings, and their being is his being’ (p. 263).
Contrary to the impression that one may gain from the recent debate 
about spirituality in psychiatry and at risk of appearing to contradict what 
has already been said above, spirituality is as much concerned with imman-
ence as it is with transcendence. For example, many people today report that 
their understanding of spirituality is concerned with relationships (Cook 
2004) – and these relationships are certainly not always with a transcendent 
order (or with God). Perhaps some quality of intimate relationships might 
be considered ‘transcendent’, but in fact it might also be argued that such 
human–human relationships are of a very natural, this-worldly, ‘immanent’ 
order, and young people especially seem to see their spirituality in immanent 
rather than transcendent relational terms (Savage et al. 2006, p. 51). Again, 
art is also seen as a source of spirituality, and while some forms of art (e.g. 
a still life) are more obviously immanent, and others (e.g. abstract art) more 
plausibly attempt to represent the transcendent, it is difficult to deny that 
spirituality is often perceived in very immanent objects.5 Paul Heelas (2008) 
suggests that many of the newer strands of spirituality, often referred to as 
New Age spirituality, are in fact characterized by their immanent focus. 
While Heelas contrasts this with the transcendent focus of the traditional 
faiths, traditional spiritualities are also not without their immanent forms, 
some of which are currently very popular. Thus, mindfulness, deriving from 
Buddhist practice, has a particular focus on awareness of the present reality. 
It is, according to Thich Nat Hanh, ‘keeping one’s consciousness alive to the 
present reality’ (Hanh 2008, p. 11).
However, if spirituality has its immanent, as well as transcendent, side, I 
would wish to argue that this immanent side is never completely divorced 
from the transcendent. Arguably, some kind of understanding of transcend-
ence, in dynamic relationship with immanence, is fundamental to the nature 
of human consciousness which, by virtue of its reflexivity, has a tendency 
to exceed or transcend its own immanent locus and contents. Thus, for 
example, James Mackey writes of incarnate, human consciousness that it 
‘projects beyond the range of reality that is already immanent in and so con-
stitutive of it’ (Mackey 2000, p. 115). This kind of projective transcendence, 
which conceives of possibilities and meanings within, above and beyond 
perceived reality, is very compatible with psychological understandings of 
transcendence of the kind considered above. However, this kind of tran-
scendence, ‘by which marks on a page are transcended towards meaning’, 
is itself in turn transcended by a ‘fuller view of transcendence’ within which 
5 For an interesting essay exploring spirituality in relation to the ‘real’ and the 
‘Real’, see O’Hear 1992.
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‘the sign (the marks with the meaning we give them) is transcended towards 
the reality it represents’ (Mackey 2000, p. 257). This ‘fuller’ transcendence 
takes us beyond purely psychological forms of transcendence.
John Hick (1989, p. 14) is, I think, talking about ‘fuller’ kinds of tran-
scendence when he distinguishes between experiences of the transcendent 
structured by a concept of deity and those that are structured by a con-
cept of the absolute. The former are schematized in such a way as to relate 
to ‘divine personae’ (Yahweh, Allah, Vishnu, etc.) and the latter in such 
a way as to relate to ‘metaphysical impersonae’ (Brahman, the Tao, etc.). 
The former might be considered more strictly theological, whereas the  latter 
(I would suggest) might be considered either philosophical or mystical. 
However, while this broadly theological level of ‘fuller’ transcendence is 
conceptually important, it is still itself a projection of consciousness that is 
psychologically understandable, based therefore in the immanent order of 
things and inseparable from this order. Theological transcendence, or fuller 
transcendence, is a concept imaginable because of the psychological capac-
ity for interpretive transcendence. But interpretive transcendence is firmly 
located within immanent, psychological, human capacities.
Mircea Eliade employs the term hierophany to ‘denote the act of mani-
festation of the sacred’ (1968, pp. 124–5). We noted above that in contem-
porary psychological usage (e.g. by Pargament or Koenig) there is a close 
relationship between the sacred and the transcendent. However, for Eliade, 
the sacred – the ‘wholly other’ – is a power that is experienced sometimes 
in very natural ways:
Beginning from the most elementary hierophany – for example the mani-
festation of the sacred in any object whatever, say a stone or a tree – and 
ending in the supreme hierophany, the incarnation of God in Jesus Christ, 
there is no real break in the continuity. (p. 124)
The sacred, then, is manifest in a continuous spectrum of modalities, rang-
ing from the mundane to the divine, from the completely immanent to the 
completely transcendent. When Eliade does use the word ‘transcendence’ 
specifically (which he mostly seems to prefer here not to do), it is in relation 
to the Supreme Being, in respect of whom the hierophany becomes a the-
ophany, but this transcendent power is in direct continuity with the power 
that is experienced in all things.
All of this considered, it seems very difficult to argue that spirituality is 
only about transcendence. It seems to be at least as much about immanence. 
But it is also not clear that the categories are as easily separable as they might 
at first appear. Thus, take for example Polly Young- Eisendrath’s reference 
to psychotherapy as a form of ‘ordinary transcendence’ (see above). While 
we can see what she means by use of the term transcendence in the context 
of psychotherapy, the term is clearly not employed so as to imply any-
thing supernatural or religious. It is, rather, a recognition of transcendence 
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within the immanent order of things. Similarly, the various psychological 
approaches to self-transcendence, interpretive transcendence and transcend-
ence as motivation are firmly bedded in the immanent order of things.
Connolly has suggested that we might distinguish between ‘radical tran-
scendence’ and ‘mundane transcendence’. Radical transcendence is defined 
as ‘a God who creates, informs, governs, or inspires activity in the mundane 
world while also exceeding the awareness of its participants’ (2010, p. 131).
In contrast, and somewhat more obscurely, mundane transcendence 
is defined by Connolly as ‘any activity outside conscious awareness that 
crosses into actuality, making a difference to what the latter becomes or 
interfacing with it in fecund ways, again without being susceptible to full 
representation’ (p. 131). 
Connolly clearly understands mundane transcendence as being located in 
a world of immanence and speaks of ‘radical immanence’ as advancing ‘an 
image of mundane transcendence’ (pp. 132–3). One might say, then, that 
if immanence and transcendence are at the ends of some kind of spectrum, 
then there is yet a middle ground within which transcendence is manifest in 
the ordinary.6
While transcendence and immanence have their opposing and contrasting 
characteristics, it is not the case that theology (at least within the  Christian 
tradition, but probably much more widely) has ever seen them as alterna-
tives, one of which is to be favoured over the other, but rather as a dialectical 
tension within which neither can be adequately understood without the 
other. Thus, for example, take James Mackey:
Transcendence and immanence, in their properly sophisticated senses, 
turn out to be correlative terms rather than contraries; each calling for the 
other, rather than replacing each other, as happens when transcendence is 
taken in the crude sense of separation. (2000, p. 117)
It would seem to be the crude sense of separation of transcendence and 
immanence that has caused problems in the debate concerning spirituality 
and psychiatry, rather than the properly sophisticated senses of immanence 
and transcendence in tension.
We might imagine, then, that some of the present controversies concern-
ing the place of spirituality in psychiatry might be advanced by bringing the 
6 Although it seems less often to be spoken of, I think that personal and impersonal 
senses of transcendence may be much more difficult to reconcile than the radical and 
mundane. Increasing scientific awareness of the enormity of the universe and the discov-
eries of quantum physics have respectively expanded our awareness of the outer and the 
inner worlds to which we relate. Both are in a certain sense self-evidently ‘transcendent’, 
at least in a mundane sense and in respect to their scale of size and power, but they are 
not necessarily evidence of any personal, intelligent or self-aware transcendent reality. 
It is less easy to think of ‘middle of the spectrum’ forms of transcendence between the 
personal and impersonal than it is between the radical and mundane.
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immanent dimension of spirituality back into the conversation. If psychiatry 
represents, in some sense, an immanent frame of reference within which 
mental disorder and well-being have been understood, and if spirituality 
has been seen as a transcendent frame of reference within which meaning 
and well-being might be found, then perhaps there is a way of relating these 
frames of reference in a creative tension, or at least of finding middle ground 
between them.
A secular age
An important account of the dynamics between transcendence and im-
manence in our secular age has been provided by Charles Taylor. The 
implications of Taylor’s account of secularity for the practice of psychiatry 
are just beginning to be assessed (Crossley 2012; Cook 2012), but there is 
reason to think that it has much relevance to the present debate about the 
place of spirituality in psychiatry (King and Leavey 2010; Cook 2010).
In the world today, transcendence is associated both with diverse emerg-
ing new forms of spirituality and with traditional religious faith. In either 
case, according to Charles Taylor, it is something to which secularity seems 
to be deeply opposed (2007). For Taylor, in the context of a secular age ‘in 
which the eclipse of all goals beyond human flourishing become conceiv-
able’ (p. 19), religion is definable in terms of transcendence.7 Transcendence 
in turn is to be understood in three dimensions (p. 20). First, it is an agency 
or power or God of faith, a good higher than or beyond human flourishing. 
Second, however, and intimately related to this, is a possibility of human 
transformation, a higher good attainable by human beings only through 
participation in God’s power and love. Third, this transformation opens the 
possibility of life transcending the natural scope of life between birth and 
death in this world.
In contrast, for Taylor’s secular age, immanence confines itself to the lim-
its of possible knowledge. The immanent frame of our present secular age 
is constituted by a natural, this-worldly order of scientific, social, techno-
logical, epistemological and other ‘structures’. Among these are certain 
‘closed world structures’ (CWS) that restrict our grasp of things. Appearing 
obvious, neutral, objective and natural, they are often more or less invisible 
and unrecognized for what they are. However, they are also deeply value 
laden and, in particular, are closed to transcendence. Taylor believes that 
the immanent frame of our present secular age is associated with a ‘malaise 
of immanence’ characterized by fragility of meaning, loss of solemnity in 
life transitions and a sense of flatness and ordinariness about everyday life. 
In this context, he describes a ‘nova’ phenomenon (or imman ent counter-
enlightenment) of an explosion of new ways of apprehending transcendence 
7 We should note, however, that there are non-religious forms of transcendence, and 
that religion is not necessarily associated with transcendence (Casanova 2010). 
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within our secular age. These include both a return to ancient faith trad-
itions and also new, more subjective and individual, forms of  spirituality.8 
Taylor’s account, I believe, goes a long way towards accounting for the 
controversies around spirituality in the mental healthcare arena. Spiritu-
ality – when introduced into a secular context such as that of healthcare 
– breaks the rule of the immanent frame that transcendence should not be 
included in public discourse on important issues. Moreover, it challenges 
the CWS, which are central to that immanent frame, and thus provokes a 
strong reaction from within the immanent frame. At the same time, that 
immanent frame, as represented by psychiatry, contributes to the malaise of 
immanence, a malaise to which the ‘nova phenomenon’ with all its various 
options for transcendence is itself a reaction. One might almost say that 
psychiatry, to the extent that it has resorted to the immanent frame as its 
primary reference point, has in fact provided exactly the kind of context 
within which one might have expected transcendence to be sought. It is a 
part of the malaise to which transcendence is seen as a solution, a solution 
that it more or less invites.
Taylor’s analysis is conducted at a social level, but psychological research 
is increasingly providing an evidence base to suggest that the transcendent 
(or the sacred, or spirituality) provides many people with important coping 
resources in times of illness or adversity, including mental ill health (Parga-
ment 2011). Now that users of mental health services are taking advantage 
of opportunities to voice their need for such resources, and many more 
 mental health professionals also are seeing attention to spirituality as being 
an important aspect of their vocation to meet those needs, the scene for the 
present controversies about spirituality and psychiatry is set.
Immanence, transcendence and psychiatry
Psychiatry, as a scientific discipline, largely finds its identification with the 
immanent frame of reference described by Taylor. It does this most espe-
cially when it focuses on neuroscience, on pharmacological treatments and 
on forms of psychotherapy that fundamentally exclude transcendence. 
How ever, it does have its moments of ‘ordinary transcendence’, for example 
in certain forms of psychotherapy, as described by Polly Young-Eisendrath. 
It has also been open to some forms of spirituality such as mindfulness 
– now incorporated in official guidelines for relapse prevention of depres-
sion (National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence 2009) – perhaps 
precisely because they are recognized as being of a more immanent (or mun-
danely transcendent) nature.
8 Taylor also acknowledges that there are certain kinds of ‘immanent transcend ence’, 
wherein there is not understood as being any life beyond death, but where, paradoxically, 
there is yet ‘life beyond life’ (2007, pp. 374, 726)
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Given a more sophisticated notion of the relationship between imma-
nence and transcendence and given the present state of affairs in our secular 
age that Taylor describes, I would suggest that there are potential problems 
when either immanence or transcendence is exaggerated at the expense of 
the other. Thus the present problems are with an exaggeration of imma-
nence: transcendence is trivialized or denied, and spirituality becomes a 
utilitarian phenomenon that is either completely excluded or else put to the 
service of improved health and well-being rather than to any transcendent 
aim (Shuman and Meador 2003). Meanings associated with spirituality in 
this context are fragile, this-worldly phenomena and many ordinary  people 
find themselves looking for something more.
While it is not our present primary problem, I can also envisage an 
imbalance within which transcendence is exaggerated at the expense of im-
manence. In this situation, we might find spirituality devoid of content. No 
longer anchored in any particular historical tradition (perhaps because it is 
emphasized as a common feature of different traditions in which it becomes 
overemphasized in reaction to the immanent frame, or perhaps because 
it adopts an anti-intellectualism), this kind of transcendence might resort 
to supernatural explanations that completely deny the place of science or 
of immanent explanations for things. Such an overexaggeration of tran-
scendence might find itself completely divorced from present this-worldly 
realities. Tendencies in this direction might be found in certain healing 
practices (both traditional and New Age) that reject conventional medical 
treatments and emphasize the need for faith (even ‘blind’ faith).
But neither of these situations, in which immanence or transcendence 
are respectively exaggerated, truly represents the nature of traditional 
understandings of spirituality. It may therefore be the case that recent con-
troversies concerning the place of spirituality in psychiatry are based on a 
misunderstanding of the true nature of spirituality (as opposed to religion). 
Or they may simply be about the use of the word ‘spirituality’. Perhaps if we 
spoke only of such things as relationship, meaning, value and self- awareness 
there would be less controversy? Yet this again would be a triumph of the 
CWS in keeping transcendence out of the conversation, and, if Taylor is 
right, the malaise of immanence would seem to require some kind of more 
explicitly transcendent therapy.
Ironically, spirituality, theology and psychiatry share common concerns 
with immanent subjective human experience, and perhaps it is because of 
this common ground that they have come into conflict with each other. 
Belief, or non-belief, in the transcendent is associated with important eth-
ical, psychological and professional concerns in clinical practice. Can one 
really understand why an alcohol-dependent patient fails to make progress 
with relapse prevention therapy, for example, unless one has understood 
her reasons for wishing to stop (or not to stop) drinking? Very often, in 
my experience, these reasons are concerned with the most important things 
in life – often given very non-religious names and often explained in very 
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non-spiritual terms. They are, nonetheless, deeply spiritual concerns and 
sometimes (often if the patient is involved in Alcoholics Anonymous) given 
a transcendent reference under the name of a ‘Higher Power’, if not a more 
explicit name for God.
Spiritual practices are found in immanent as well as transcendent forms, 
and so it is difficult to know why there should really be any objection to 
their use in practice – as has already happened with guidelines for the use 
of mindfulness in the treatment of depression. A patient-centred model of 
treatment would identify the most relevant spiritual language (usually that 
employed initially by the patient) and the most relevant spiritual practices 
for the person at hand. However, in reality, immanence and transcendence 
are always closely correlated, and it might be argued that such a process is 
more about avoiding offence, more about avoiding controversial challenges 
to CWS, than it is about avoiding transcendence. To those inclined to inter-
pret reality in terms of a transcendent order, it will in any case be difficult to 
have an adequate clinical conversation about meaning without employing 
the language of transcendence.
In fact, the language of transcendence (especially in its ordinary or mun-
dane forms) does provide some common ground within which clinical and 
scientific conversations can take place. It does not require participants in the 
conversation to take a confessional stance, either asserting or denying their 
belief in God or in any particular faith tradition. It is accessible to psycho-
logical interpretations (self-transcendence and interpretive transcendence), 
which also do not require that any particular theological or philosophical 
position is adopted by either or both of the conversation partners. Thus, 
it creates the possibility of meaningful dialogue, with integrity, between a 
clinician and a patient. It also allows the possibility of scientific research, 
within the immanent frame of reference, to be undertaken in relation to the 
part that beliefs in the transcendent play in helping (or hindering) people in 
their recovery from mental disorders.
This does not mean that the word ‘transcendence’ has to be used by clin-
icians, for clearly many patients will not understand this or else will not find 
it conducive. However, it does provide a relatively neutral category within 
which conversations about God, a Higher Power, a natural spirit, energy or 
force can be placed. Because the concept of transcendence does not require 
theological interpretation, I do not see why it cannot be employed with 
integrity by the atheist psychiatrist. Because it is amenable to theological 
interpretation, it provides space within which the Christian, Muslim, Hindu 
or other religious person can conduct their conversation meaningfully.
If the account of things that I have sketched out here, based on Taylor’s 
understanding of our secular age, has validity, it is to be expected that an 
immanent frame will continue to reject reference to the transcendent and 
that exaggerations of emphasis on the transcendent will continue to emerge 
in response. A better hope for resolution of this state of affairs is thus to 
pursue a more sophisticated (theological) discourse that recognizes the true 
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nature of the relationship between immanence and transcendence and that 
refuses to be polarized or drawn into defence of the crude use of terms. This 
is not a merely academic point. It has implications, for good or ill, for the 
way in which mental health service users in the future find themselves able 
(or unable) to discuss the things that matter most deeply to them with those 
who care for them.
Conclusions
Transcendence emerges, I would suggest, as a central concept both for pro-
tagonists and antagonists within the debate concerning the proper place 
of spirituality in psychiatry. If we accept and apply Taylor’s model of an 
immanent frame of reference, with its CWS opposed to transcendence, as 
applicable to psychiatry, then this is not surprising. Transcendence is both 
the source of offence to those who accept and prefer the immanent frame 
of reference, and it is the appropriate remedy for those who (consciously or 
unconsciously) find themselves suffering from the malaise of immanence. 
However, transcendence, understood in its properly more sophisticated 
sense as inseparable from immanence, also provides a language that can 
potentially bridge the gap and enable both scientific research and clinical 
engagement to proceed and also facilitate a less polarized conversation.
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